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Louis Fisher** 
By confronting President Harry Truman and striking down 
his effort to seize the steel mills needed to prosecute the Korean 
War,' the Supreme Court adhered to its longstanding practice of 
accepting and deciding cases dealing with the war power. Yet 
over the next half century the courts systematically sidestepped 
this type of case. In this essay, we will explain why the Court as-
serted itself in 1952 and why the modern Court seems incapable, 
or unwilling, to decide fundamental constitutional issues regard-
ing the allocation of the war power between Congress and the 
President. 
Before turning to the 1952 steel seizure, we need to flag a 
dispute. Some defenders of presidential war power do not re-
gard Youngstown as a foreign affairs case. Instead, they view it 
as a case about the "taking of private property without due 
process of law."2 Others, who think that Congress and the 
courts should check presidential war-making, call Youngstown 
"the Brown v. Board of Education of foreign affairs litigation. "3 
But no matter how one characterizes Youngstown's precedential 
significance, the Court's willingness to assert itself can be traced, 
in part, to the Justices' then-customary practice of adjudicating 
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war-making disputes, disposing of them as they would any other 
legal or constitutional dispute. 
Section I of this essay explains why we think this is so, call-
ing attention to a host of factors contributing to the Court's re-
pudiation of the seizure. Section II builds upon this analysis. 
Following a brief discussion of how Supreme Court decision-
making is tied to social and political forces, we explore why to-
day's Court is loath to assume its traditional role in our system of 
checks and balances. In particular, pointing to fundamental 
changes in executive-legislative relations over the past fifty 
years, we explain how the modern Court has altered its deci-
sionmaking. In Section III, we suggest that this reversal, while 
understandable, is undermining our system of constitutional 
governance. In our view, no branch should hold a monopoly 
over the initiation of war. 
I. JUDGES CONFRONT TRUMAN 
President Harry Truman took the initiative in June 1950 to 
order U.S. forces to Korea. By acting solely on his interpreta-
tion of presidential power, Truman became the first president to 
involve the Nation in a major war without receiving specific au-
thorization from Congress. Nevertheless, had the Steel Seizure 
Case reached the courts in late 1950 or early 1951, judges-leery 
to hinder prosecution of the war-might have sidestepped a ju-
dicial resolution of the issue.5 At that time, Congress and the na-
tion backed the president's initiative.6 However, by the time 
Truman issued his 1952 executive order taking control of certain 
steel companies, a cluster of military, legal, and political factors 
conspired to markedly erode presidential power and embolden 
the judiciary. 
4. See Louis Fisher, The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?, 89 
Am. J. Inti. Law 21 (1995); David Gray Adler, Foreign Policy and the Separation of Pow-
ers: The Influence of the Judiciary, in Michael W. McCann and Gerald L. Houseman, 
eds., Judging the Constitution: Critical Essays on Judicial Lawmaking 172 (Scott, Fores-
man and Co., 1989); Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication on War and Spending 20-21, 
50 (Texas A & M U. Press, 2000) ("Abdication") (distinguishing Korea from instances 
where presidents had acted without Congress's approval); EdwardS. Corwin, The Presi-
dent's Power, New Republic 16 (Jan. 29, 1951). 
5. See Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court 1951 Term-Foreword: The Year of the 
Steel Case, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 89, 90 (1952) (discussing how the Supreme Court could have 
slowed down the Steel Seizure litigation). For additional discussion, see notes 76-77. 
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The context of the case put the President's power as Com-
mander in Chief front and center. Truman's executive order was 
drafted almost entirely as a military imperative. The second 
paragraph pointed out that "American fighting men and fighting 
men of the United Nations are now engaged in deadly combat 
with the forces of aggression in Korea."7 The weapons and mate-
rials needed for that effort "are produced to a great extent in this 
country, and steel is an indispensable component of substantially 
all of such weapons and materials."8 A work stoppage, he 
warned, "would immediately jeopardize and imperil our national 
defense and the defense of those joined with us in resisting ag-
gression, and would add to the continuing danger of our soldiers, 
sailors, and airmen engaged in combat in the field." 9 The first of 
seven paragraphs ordering the Secretary of Commerce to seize 
the steel mills directed him to take possession of all such plants 
"as he may deem necessary in the interests of national de-
fense."10 
For proponents of unilateral presidential war-making, Tru-
man's seizing of the steel mills could not have come at a worse 
time. By 1952, the United States had reached a stalemate in Ko-
rea, resulting in heavy American casualties and providing little 
hope for success. 11 With public opposition to his war swelling, 
Truman's standing in public opinion reached its nadir. 12 The Ko-
rean issue, "not crooks or Communists," "cut deepest" with the 
voters. 13 For example, the high point of the 1952 presidential 
campaign came on October 24 when Dwight D. Eisenhower de-
nounced Truman's war, promising to end it by "go[ing] to Ko-
rea."14 
Dissatisfaction with the war destroyed Truman's popularity 
and had much to do with Eisenhower's landslide victory. It also 
called attention to the fact that, legally, Truman had been skat-
ing on thin ice throughout the Korean conflict. 15 He claimed to 
7. Exec. Order No. 10,340,17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Apr. 8, 1952). 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 3141. 
10. Id. 
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be acting in response to a resolution adopted by the United Na-
tions Security Council. 16 But that claim was false. Truman had 
committed U.S. forces before the Council called for military ac-
tion. As his Secretary of State Dean Acheson later admitted, 
"some American action, said to be in support of the resolution of 
June 27, was in fact ordered, and possibly taken, prior to the 
resolution.'' 17 More significant, Truman ignored Congress's 
statutory command in the U.N. Participation Act of 1945, that 
Congress (through legislation or a joint resolution) first approve 
the deployment of forces in a U.N. initiated action. 18 For this 
reason, Truman pointed to his December 1950 proclamation of a 
national emergency as legal authority for seizing the steel mills, 
not the U.N. authorization of military action. 19 
Truman was on shaky legal footing for another reason. In 
large measure, his decision to seize the steel mills was tied to his 
refusal to make use of two statutory remedies prescribed by 
Congress.20 By invoking the Taft-Hartley Act, for example, 
Truman could have temporarily enjoined steel workers from 
striking and, in this way, could have averted a work stoppage 
without seizing control of the steel mills. But Truman, a friend 
of labor, had earlier vetoed Taft-Hartley.21 Indeed, instead of 
following Taft-Hartley procedures, Truman referred the steel 
dispute to the Wage Stabilization Board. And when that effort 
failed, Truman again refused to invoke Taft-Hartley-claiming 
both that it was unfair to labor (who had already postponed 
striking) and that the "greed[ ]" of steel companies threatened 
"our whole price control program. "22 
Fisher, Presidential War Power 70-91 (U. Press of Kansas, 1995). 
16. 1950 Pub. Papers 492. 
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20. See Maeva Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case: The Limits of Presiden-
tial Power 77-78 (Duke U. Press, 1994) (discussing the national emergency dispute provi-
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hourly increase of 26 cents. McCullough, Truman at 897-98 (cited in note 13). In re-
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Against this backdrop, Truman had a hard time convincing 
the nation that the steel seizure represented a national emer-
gency instead of a labor dispute. Newspapers repeatedly de-
clared that the "United States government was no longer a 'neu-
tral referee' in labor-management dispute[s)."23 Time magazine 
accused Truman of acting "primarily as a politician, not as a 
President ... Politician Harry Truman was obviously operating 
on the axiom of political arithmetic that there are more votes in 
Big Labor than in Big Steel."24 And the Nation argued that "a 
just settlement of a labor dispute" is not enough to excuse the 
president's "arbitrary exercise of executive power."25 
Making matters worse, Truman's initial defense of the steel 
seizure was grounded in an ambitious theory of unlimited presi-
dential power, namely, "that the president's power was absolute 
unless some provision of the Constitution expressly denied au-
thority to him. "26 One week after the seizure, at a news confer-
ence on April 17, a reporter asked: "Mr. President, if you can 
seize the steel mills under your inherent powers, can you, in your 
opinion, also seize the newspapers and/or the radio stations?" 
Truman never flinched: "Under similar circumstances the Presi-
dent has to act for whatever is for the best of the country. That's 
the answer to your question."27 Three days later, at another 
news conference, Truman claimed that the president "has verts 
great inherent powers to meet great national emergencies." 8 
More telling, when asked if he recognized the "danger" to our 
liberties by substituting inherent presidential power for the writ-
ten law, Truman responded: "Well, of course I do ... But when 
you meet an emergency in an emergency, you have to meet it. "29 
In other words, Truman was not merely asserting authority over 
certain domestic activities, but was announcing an overarching 
theory of presidential emergency authority that cut across every 
area, domestic and foreign. 
sponse, the steel companies demanded a $12 a ton increase to the price of steel (as a con· 
dition to their agreeing to the Board's recommendation on wages). Id. at 898. Accusing 
the companies of being "profiteer[s)," Truman thought the price of settling this labor 
dispute was simply too high. ld. 
23. Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 90 (cited in note 20). 
24. ld. (quoting Time 23 (Apr. 21, 1952)). 
25. Id at 89 (quoting the Nation 393 (Apr. 26, 19520)). 
26. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court at 190 (cited in note 12). 
27. Pub. Papers (1952-1953) at 272-73 (Truman). 
28. ld. at 290. 
29. ld at 294. 
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The public reaction was swift and savage. The great major-
ity of newspapers rejected this sweeping doctrine of executive 
power. An editorial in the New York Times rebuked Truman for 
creating "a new regime of government by executive decree," a 
system of government that was inconsistent "with our own de-
mocratic principle of government by laws and not by men. "30 
The Washington Post predicted that Truman's action "will 
probably go down in history as one of the most high-handed acts 
committed by an American President."31 Other newspapers 
weighed in with various forms of denunciation, excoriating Tru-
man for trying to exercise "dictatorial powers."32 The Atlanta 
Constitution called Truman's order "dangerous"; the Boston 
Herald objected to Truman's effort to "dictatorially" bypass 
Congress by making his own law; the Christian Science Monitor 
accused him of precipitating "a constitutional and political cri-
sis"; and the Detroit Free Press warned that unless someone 
stopped Truman's exertion of power "our whole constitutional 
system is doomed to destruction. "33 
Truman soon recognized that his definition of emergency 
power was too high-flying and ill-defined to sit well with the 
public. He pointed out, for example, that Congress could pass 
legislation "reject[ing] the course of action I have followed in 
this matter. "34 These efforts to define executive power in a less 
ominous light, however, were quickly dispelled by Justice De-
partment attorneys. In district court, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Homer Baldridge told Judge David A. Pine that President 
Truman had sufficient power under the Constitution to seize the 
steel mills. It seemed to Baldridge that "there is enough residual 
power in the executive to meet an emergency situation of this 
type when it comes up." Pine's reaction was chilling: "I think 
that whatever decision I reach, Mr. Baldridge, I shall not adopt 
the view that there is anyone in this Government whose power is 
unlimited, as you seem to indicate."35 
Baldridge refused to back off, as prudence or political 
judgment might have dictated. He advised Pine that there were 
30. Editorial, The Seizure Order, N.Y. Times 28 (Apr. 10, 1952). 
31. 98 Cong. Rec. 4034 (1952). 
32. Id. at 4033 (New York Daily Compass). 
33. Id 
34. 1952-53 Pub. Papers 284. Truman also acknowledged that he was bound by the 
rule of law. Instead of bold and blustery statements about inherent power, Truman spoke 
of presidential powers as "limited, of course, by the provisions of the Constitution, par-
ticularly those that protect the rights of individuals." I d. at 301. 
35. H.R. Doc. No. 534 (Part I), 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 258 (1952). 
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only two limitations on executive power: "One is the ballot box 
and the other is impeachment." When Judge Pine asked 
whether he was arguing that when a "sovereign people" granted 
powers to the federal government, "it limited Congress, it lim-
ited the judiciary, but did not limit the executive," Baldridge 
cheerfully replied: "That's our conception, Your Honor."36 Ju-
dicial review was not a limitation? Pine pursued the point, asking 
whether if the President determines that an emergency exists, 
"the Courts cannot even review whether it is an emergency." 
Baldridge's response: "That is correct."37 
Judge Pine lost little time in jettisoning this theory of 
"unlimited and unrestrained Executive power."38 In striking 
down the executive order on April 29, Pine set about demolish-
ing the theory of an emergency power that is not subject to judi-
cial review: "To my mind this [theory) spells a form of govern-
ment alien to our Constitutional government of limited powers" 
and, consequently, to recognize it "would undermine public con-
fidence in the verx edifice of government as it is known under 
the Constitution." 9 
Pine's blistering opinion was embraced by the press and, ul-
timately, the public. A Washington Post editorial spoke of the 
opinion as one "that will long be remembered in the annals of 
free government."40 Perhaps more significant, as The New York 
Times contended, Pine's opinion shifted attention away from the 
labor dispute in the steel industry and to "the question of consti-
tutional powers and relationships."41 Indeed, by suggesting that 
the "awful results" of a strike "would be less injurious to the 
public" than recognition of the president's claim of unbounded 
power,42 Pine's opinion prompted the "first serious questioning 
in the press of the extent of the emergency. "43 An editorial in 
The Wall Street I ournal, for example, suggested that the only 
proof offered by Truman was his pronouncement that an emer-
gency existed.44 
36. Joseph A. Loftus, President's Power Is Not Restricted, Says U.S. Lawyer, N.Y. 
Times, 1 (Apr. 26, 1952). See also Joseph Paull, U.S. Argues President Is Above Courts, 
Wash. Post 1 (Apr. 25, 1952). 
37. H.R. Doc. No. 534 (Part I) at 371-72. 
38. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569,577 (D.D.C. 1952). 
39. Id. at 576-77. 
40. Editorial, Steel Injunction, Wash. Post 16 (Apr. 30 1952). 
41. Editorial, Government Under Law, N.Y. Times 26 (Apr. 30, 1952). 
42. 103 F. Supp. at 577. 
43. Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 131 (cited in note 20). 
44. Id. at 131 (discussing Wall St. J. at 8 (Apr. 30, 1952)). 
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The consequence of all this was quite devastating to the 
president. Gallup Polls showed that growing public disapproval 
of the seizure was tied to the Pine decision. And this popular re-
action "traveled through the higher courts ... [becomingl an im-
portant element in the legal decision-making process." 5 The 
administration tried to turn the tide of public opinion but could 
not. Scrambling for a more publicly (and judicially) acceptable 
definition of presidential authority, executive officials now en-
tirely jettisoned the sweeping arguments made before the district 
court. In particular, rather than rely on the president's inherent 
powers, the government also argued that the president was sim-
ply putting into effect the defense programs authorized by Con-
gress.46 
Administration efforts to recalibrate their position proved 
futile. With neither a formal declaration of war nor explicit 
statutory authorization to seize the steel mills, Solicitor General 
Philip Perlman was unable to erase the lasting impression left by 
the government's highly publicized district court argument. 
When Perlman sought to close his argument with rhetorical 
flourish, insisting that "we are under war conditions," Justices 
Jackson and Frankfurter pointed out that Congress did not view 
Korea as a war.47 Perlman's claim that Truman was quite willing 
to follow congressional directions likewise met resistance. Ques-
tioning by Justice Frankfurter disclosed that the administration 
treated Congress's failure to outlaw the seizure as de facto legis-
lative approval of it;48 questioning by Justice Jackson and Chief 
Justice Vinson underscored the administration's belief that it 
had independent authority to seize the mills.49 
On June 2, 1952, the Court issued its decision invalidating 
the seizure. "Few decisions," according to reactions reported in 
The New York Times and Harvard Law Review, "have been so 
popularly received."50 Earl Warren, then governor of California, 
hailed the decision for "remov[ing] the challenge to the basic 
American principle that we have three equal and coordinate 
45. Id. at 130. Accord Rehnquist, The Supreme Coun at 191-92 (cited in note 12). 
46. Brief for Petitioner Charles Sawyer, 144-172, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
47. Philip B. Kurland and Gerhard Casper eds., 48 Landmark Briefs and Arguments 
of the Supreme Coun of the United States: Constitutional Law 959 (U. Publications of 
America, 1975). 
48. Id. at 908. 
49. Id. at 906-07. 
50. The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 98, 99 (1952) (citing N.Y. 
Times news stories). 
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branches of governrnent."51 Most in Congress likewise praised 
the Court for "declar[ing] that our Constitution is not to be em-
ployed to serve the purposes and whims of individual men."52 
For their part, newspapers praised the Court for "fulfill[ing] its 
constitutional duty to check a headstrong president. "53 
One of the law clerks on the Supreme Court in 1952 was 
William Rehnquist. At the time of the decision, he thought that 
Truman would win. After all, the Court was comprised of Roo-
sevelt and Truman appointees and "the entire decisional trend 
for fifteen years [1937-52] had been in the direction of the a§-
grandizement of the powers of the president and Congress." 4 
That the Justices went so decisively against presidential power, 
in the middle of a war, came as a surprise to many. Years later, 
reflecting on what happened in district court and the Supreme 
Court, Rehnquist developed a keener appreciation of the impact 
of public opinion on the judiciary. He now concluded: "I think 
that this is one of those celebrated constitutional cases where 
what might be called the tide of public opinion suddenly began 
to run against the government, for a number of reasons, and that 
this tide of public opinion had a considerable influence on the 
Court."55 
* * * * * 
Many factors made the Steel Seizure case "one of a kind": 
Truman was an unpopular, pro-labor president; he seized private 
property in an effort to sidestep the dictates of Taft-Hartley; and 
he justified the seizure by pointing to a war that increasingly 
seemed unwinable. In 1952, moreover, the culture of expecta-
tions governing presidential war-making made the steel seizure 
case unique. At that time, presidents did not send troops into a 
major war without congressional approval. Likewise, the Senate 
did not approve the U.N. or NATO as a way of end-running 
Congress. And finally, presidents did not point to their inherent 
powers as "commander in chief" as a warrant for unilateral ex-
51. Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 213 (cited in note 20) (quoting 
L.A. Times 1 (June 3, 1952)). 
52. 98 Cong. Rec. 6289 (1952) (remarks of Senator Harry Cain). For additional 
quotes, see Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 213 (cited in note 20). 
53. Id. at 213 (quoting The Pittsburgh Press 22 (June 3, 1952)). 
54. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court at 171 (cited in note 12). 
55. William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It Was, How it Is 95 (William 
Morrow and Co., 1987). See also Rehnquist, The Supreme Court at 192 (cited in note 12) 
(same). 
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ecutive war-making.56 Instead, at the time of Youngstown, 
courts saw war-making as part and parcel of our system of 
checks and balances-something that Congress and the courts 
had a say in. 
More than anything else, it was this culture of expectations 
that explains the judiciary's repudiation of Truman's steel sei-
zure. Consider, for example, then-existing norms governing ju-
dicial involvement in the war power. From 1789 to 1952, federal 
courts accepted and adjudicated disputes over war. Could Con-
gress either declare or authorize war? Yes, it could do either 
one, said the Supreme Court in 1800 and 1801.57 What happened 
when a presidential proclamation conflicted with statutory pol-
icy? Which one prevailed? An 1804 decision sided with Con-
gress. 58 Could the administration seize, as enemy property, ma-
terial found on U.S. land at the commencement of hostilities in 
1812? Not without congressional authority, said the Court.59 
Could the President, as Commander in Chief, annex territory to 
the United States by virtue of a military conquest? No, said the 
Court in 1850, unless the President received authority from Con-
gress.60 
Many other war power cases came to the Court and were 
decided there. Federal courts have had to decide when wars be-
gin and when they end. What power does a President have in 
imposing duties on goods coming from the United States to a 
conquered country? He has that power, but not after ratification 
of the treaty of peace, when the power to impose duties returns 
to Congress.61 Federal courts have placed limits on military au-
thorities who made arrests without a warrant. 62 Courts reviewed 
the constitutionality of war-efficiency statutes that continued in 
operation after the signing of an armistice.63 A number of World 
56. Even during World War II, when there was little collaboration between Con-
gress and the president, "Presidents (whenever acting unilaterally) always offered an ex-
cuse or rationale; never did they assert that they had inherent war power." Michael Rat-
ner and David Cole, The Force of Law: Judicial Enforcement of the War Powers 
Resolution, 17 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 715, 723 (1984) (discussing W. Taylor Reveley, Presi-
dential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative or Usurpation?, 55 Va. L. Rev. 1243 
(1969)). 
57. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (Dall.) 37 (1800); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 
(1801 ). 
58. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). 
59. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814). 
60. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850). 
61. Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901). 
62. Ex parte Orozco, 201 F. 106 (W.D. Tex. 1912), dismissed, 229 U.S. 633 (1913). 
63. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919). 
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War II cases required judges to determine the extent to which 
Congress could delegate its powers to administrative officials.64 
Could Congress and the President place curfews on Japanese-
Americans and later place them in detention camps? The Court 
decided both issues.6 In a number of cases, the Court tackled 
the legitimacy of military trials and military tribunals.66 
These rulings sided at times with the president and some-
times against him. Many of the decisions approved governmen-
tal claims of military necessity and/or upheld broad delegations 
of power to the president.67 By 1952, moreover, the balance of 
power between Congress and the president had begun to shift. 
When Truman sent troops to Korea, Congress did not defend its 
prerogatives; instead, it stood by on the sidelines and cheered on 
the president.68 At the same time, social and political norms did 
not see the president as the "sole organ" of the United States in 
international affairs.69 Not only did courts resolve these dis-
putes/0 Korea stood as the sole exception to the general consti-
64. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 424 (1944); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 
(1944). 
65. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214 (1944). 
66. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); 
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946). 
67. Consider, for example, Korematsu's approval of the internment of Japanese 
Americans during World War II. Here, the Court accepted at face value government 
claims of military necessity. See Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 181 (1962) (explaining judicial reluctance to second-guess military judg-
ments). 
68. See note 6 and accompanying text. 
69. We refer here, of course, to dicta in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exporr 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). In Youngstown, the Court (both in Justice Black's ma-
jority opinion and in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion) distanced itself from Curtiss-
Wright, concluding that Curtiss-Wrighr rested on whether or not Congress had delegated 
power to the president (and not on the president's inherent power). See 343 U.S. at 585 
(majority opinion); id. at 635-36 n.2 (Jackson, concurring). This view is consistent with 
an early analysis of the case published in the Harvard Law Review. See Recent Cases, 50 
Harv. L. Rev. 691, 692 (1937) (noting that "the theory of the decision" links Congress's 
power over foreign commerce to the "President's control over foreign relations" and 
concluding that "how far the delegation may go remains for future clarification."). See 
also Michael J. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy 18 (Princeton U. Press, 1990) (sug-
gesting that the Court saw Curtiss-Wright as a way to respond to fears that recent non-
delegation decisions "might straitjacket the United States in dealing with the Nazi 
threat"). 
70. For an overview, sec notes 57-66; Major Geoffrey S. Corn, Presidential War 
Powers: Do the Courts Offer Any Answers?, 157 Mil. L. Rev. 180, 205-15 (1998). Con-
sider, for example, Curtiss-Wright. Rather than suggest that courts should not review 
executive actions in foreign affairs, the Court did review the President's actions (uphold-
mg It as bemg authonzed by Congress). See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Al-
most) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 Yale L.J. 
1255, 1308 n.242. (1988). 
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tutional principle that the -Rower to initiate war against foreign 
nations lay with Congress. Lawmaker acquiescence to Korea, 
for example, did not stop Congress, in 1951, from resisting Tru-
man's efforts to send ground troops into Europe.72 Even more 
telling, Dwight Eisenhower, unwilling to preside over a Korea-
like debacle in Indochina, made clear that it "would be com-
pletely unconstitutional & indefensible" to deploy troops in "the 
absence of some kind of arrangement getting support of Con-
gress. "73 
The "struggle for the privilege of directin~ American for-
eign policy" was, in fact, a struggle in 1952.7 The norm of 
checks and balances still fueled the courts and, as such, Truman's 
unilateralism was seen as a real threat to our system of govern-
ment. That is why Judge Pine's decision resonated with the na-
tion. That too is why the Justices used the Steel Seizure case as a 
vehicle to speak broadly about the scope of executive power. 
We do not mean to suggest here that expectations regarding 
our system of checks and balances, in and of themselves, explain 
the courts' decisions in Youngstown. The unpopularity of Korea 
and, with it, Truman's plummeting support, also fueled the deci-
sion.75 Had the nation supported Truman and his war, there 
would have been no public outcry following the seizure and, 
consequently, the courts would not have been pressured to check 
a runaway president. For example, had Truman seized the steel 
mills in 1950 (when the public stood behind his Korean initia-
tive), the Supreme Court might well have looked for a way to 
avoid ruling against the president.76 There was, for example, no 
71. Fisher, Abdication at 15-33 (cited in note 4) (discussing 1789-1945 period); id. at 
36-39 (discussing 1945 UN Participation Act and 1949 NATO Treaty). 
72. Truman had claimed that he did not need congressional approval, prompting an 
outcry in both the House and Senate. Hearings were held and Truman-notwithstanding 
his claim that lawmaker approval was beside the point-waited to see what Congress 
would do. But a majority in Congress agreed with the president and the issue fizzled 
when the Senate passed a resolution approving of Truman's initiative (but contending 
that congressional approval should be obtained before future deployments of troops). 
See Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress 110-13 (cited in note 6). 
73. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, part 1, at 1242. 
See also Public Papers of the President, 1954, 306 (same). 
74. Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1957 at 171 (New 
York U. Press, 4th rev. ed.1957). 
75. It is also worth remembering that fears of totalitarianism-so pronounced in 
World War Il-remained salient in 1952. For this very reason, Truman's opponents 
analogized his actions to those of the recently defeated European dictators. As Maeva 
Marcus noted: "[t]he majority of unfavorable editorials characterized the President's ac-
tion as dictatorial [with] the New York Daily News titl[ing] its editorial 'Truman Does a 
Hitler'" Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 89 (cited in note 20). 
76. See also Rehnquist, The Supreme Court at 191 (cited in note 12) (suggesting 
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need for a judicial "rush to judgment" (bypassing the court of 
appeals and issuing a sweeping decision against the administra-
tion two months after the seizure). Indeed, before the district 
court, counsel for the steel industry did not seek to overturn the 
seizure; instead, they only sought to enjoin the Truman admini-
stration from changing the terms of employment for steel work-
. . h . 77 ers, e.g., ratsmg t eu wages. 
Ironically, the very forces that pushed the courts to check 
the White House in Youngstown later pushed the courts in the 
opposite direction. Over the past fifty years, the culture of ex-
pectations governing war powers has undergone a radical shift. 
As we will soon detail, Congress no longer sees itself as a consti-
tutional check on presidential war-making. Likewise, the public 
and press increasingly see the president as the exclusive force in 
foreign affairs. Responding to these changing norms, courts too 
have limited their role in checking presidential initiatives. In the 
next part of this essay, we will describe this phenomenon. 
II. JUDGES STEP ASIDE 
In the years since Youngstown, judicial pronouncements re-
lating to the war powers have diminished to the point of being 
virtually nonexistent.78 By making aggressive use of ripeness 
and standing limitations, for example, courts have refused to 
hear lawmaker challenges to unilateral presidential war-making. 
More generally, courts have concluded that numerous issues re-
lating to war-making are political questions. And while the 
courts have issued some decisions on national security issues, 
these rulings seem quite far removed from Youngstown (where 
the Court closely scrutinized presidential war-making). 
that the government would have prevailed if the seizure had taken place during World 
War II). 
77. Freund, 66 Harv. L. Rev. at 90 (cited in note 5). That way the courts could have 
heard evidence, rather than rely solely on affidavits. It should also be noted that the 
courts could have sidestepped the question of inherent executive power by upholding the 
president's action as consistent with existing federal law. See id at 91-94. See also note 
46 and accompanying text (describing the government's Supreme Court brief). 
78. For general treatments, see Adler, Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers, 
in McCann and Houseman, eds., Judging the Constitution (cited in note 4); Corn, 157 Mil. 
L. Rev. (cited in note 70); Jonathan L. Entin, The Dog that Rarely Barks: Why the Courts 
Won't Resolve the War Powers Debate, 47 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1305 (1997). See also 
John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War 
Powers: A Consequence of the Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 203, 306-08 (1993) (detailing reasons courts make use of justiciability 
doctrines to steer clear of war making disputes). 
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There is a relatively simple explanation for this phenome-
non. If members of Congress fail to assert their prerogatives 
over war and peace, federal judges are unwilling to fill the 
breach left open by lawmakers. At the time of Youngstown, 
Congress's failure to act was aberrational. Rather, as detailed 
above, the culture of expectations was one in which Congress 
was an active participant in war-making. Correspondingly, 
judges assumed their traditional role in our system of checks and 
balances-assessing the legality of governmental action. Today, 
Congress's general practice is to acquiesce, not challenge, presi-
dential war-making. With Congress retreating in war powers, 
courts too have backed away. This section details how social and 
political forces have pushed courts away from war powers issues. 
Before doing so, we will briefll explain why those forces should 
matter to the Supreme Court.7 
Just as the Supreme Court leaves its mark on American so-
ciety, so are social forces part of the mix of constitutional law. 
True, the Justices work in a somewhat insulated atmosphere. 
But, as Chief Justice William Rehnquist reminded us, the "cur-
rents and tides of public opinion . . . lap at the courthouse 
door,"80 for "judges go home at night and read the newspapers 
or watch the evening news on television; they talk to their family 
and friends about current events."81 As such, "[j]udges, so long 
as they are relatively normal human beings, can no more escape 
being influenced by public opinion in the long run than can peo-
ple working at other jobs."82 
Constitutional decisionmaking, moreover, is a dynamic 
process that involves all parts of government and the people as 
well. Lacking the power to appropriate funds or command the 
military, the Court understands that it must act in a way that 
garners public acceptance. Its power, as the Justices themselves 
admit, lies in its legitimacy.83 An especially telling manifestation 
79. For a more detailed explanation (from which portions of the next three para-
graphs are drawn), see Neal Devins and Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political 
Instability, 84 Va. L. Rev. 83 (1998). 
80. William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 Suffolk U. L. 
Rev. 751,768 (1986). 
81. Id. 
82. Id.; see also Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 Yale L.J. 1290, 
1314 (1937) ("[J]udicial decisions are not babies brought by constitutional storks, but are 
born out of the travail of economic circumstance."). 
83. See Tom R. Tyler and Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of 
Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 
Duke L.J. 703, 715 (1994) ("[P]ublic acceptance of the Court's role as interpreter of the 
Constitution ... enhances public acceptance of controversial Court decisions."). 
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of how public opinion affects Court decisionmaking is evident 
when the Court reverses itself to conform its decisionmaking to 
the social and political forces beating against it. In explaining 
the collapse of the Lochner era, for example, Justice Owen Rob-
erts recognized the extraordinary importance of public opinion: 
"Looking back, it is difficult to see how the Court could have re-
sisted the popular urge for uniform standards throu~hout the 
country-for what in effect was a unified economy." 4 Social 
and political forces also played a defining role in the Court's re-
consideration of decisions on sterilization and the eugenics 
movement, state-mandated flag salutes, the Roe v. Wade trimes-
ter standard, the death penalty, states' rights, and much more.85 
Absent popular support, these decisions proved ineffective. In 
the end, as Justice Robert Jackson wrote, "[t]he practical play of 
the forces of politics is such that judicial power has often delayed 
but never permanently defeated the persistent will of a substan-
tial majority. "86 
When taking social and political forces into account, more-
over, the Court is apt to "exercise the rights of governance that 
bring it prestige and to avoid exercising the rights of governance 
that may bring it harm."87 For example, when Congress signals 
the Court that it has doubts about the constitutionality of its 
handiwork, the Court does not risk much political capital by 
striking down that law.88 
* * * * * 
Under contemporary conditions, courts have little incentive 
to involve themselves in war powers disputes. Unlike Youngs-
town, unilateral executive war-making is now the norm. Not 
only has Congress abandoned its traditional role, the public and 
the media also see the president as the "sole organ" of modern 
day war-making. 
84. Owen J. Roberts, The Court and the Constitution 61 (Harvard U. Press, 1951). 
85. For support of these claims, see sources cited in Devins and Fisher, 84 Va. L. 
Rev. at 95 (cited in note 79) . 
. 86. Robert H. Jackson, Maintaining Our Freedoms: The Role of the Judiciary, 19 
V1tal Speeches of the Day, 759, 761 (1953). 
87. McGinnis, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. at 296 (cited in note 78). 
88. For a general treatment of this subject, see Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajori-
tarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 Studies in American Political 
Development 35 (1993). See also Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers 
Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 Duke L.J. 435 (2001) (discussing ways 
Ill which Congress is facilitating Rehnquist Court decisions invalidating federal statutes). 
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Starting with Korea, presidents have bypassed Congress. 
Rather than seek congressional authorization before initiating 
military actions, presidents now see Congress as an after-the-fact 
cheerleader.89 Consider, for example, Congress's response to 
President Clinton's decision to use military force in Bosnia. For 
Senate majority leader Bob Dole: "[I]n my view the President 
has the authority and the power under the Constitution to do 
what he feels should be done regardless of what Congress 
does."90 Likewise, minority leader George Mitchell opposed leg-
islation requiring the president to first seek congressional au-
thorization for military action in Bosnia because such "prior re-
straints . . . plainly violate the Constitution. "91 By suggesting 
that Congress has no role to play, lawmakers now seem more in-
terested in protecting the executive branch than their own insti-
tution. 
The constitutional position of Congress has deteriorated for 
a number of reasons. One is the volunteer army. As Joseph 
Califano has noted, an all-volunteer army "relieves affluent, vo-
cal, voting Americans of the concern that their children will be at 
risk of going into combat. "92 Likewise, deprived of a broad-
based draft, university campuses are no longer centers of anti-
war activity. Without such public pressure, lawmakers would 
rather focus their efforts on constituent services and other mat-
ters helpful to their efforts to retain their seats.93 Correspond-
ingly, the growing cost of running for office means that legisla-
tors have less time to tend to their institutional and 
constitutional duties. 
Presidents, in contrast, often have strong incentives to 
launch military initiatives. Presidents achieve status, fame if you 
will, by leading the nation into battle.94 For example, by launch-
89. For a detailing of Congress's ever-diminishing role, see Fisher, Abdication at 34-
114 (cited in note 4). See also Louis Fisher and Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Con-
stitutional Law 153-71 (West Group, 3d ed. 2001). 
90. 141 Cong. Rec. S17,529 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1995). 
91. 139 Cong. Rec. 25,483 (1993). After Clinton deployed troops in 1995, the Sen-
ate defeated a "congressional authorization" bill by a vote of 77 to 22. 141 Cong. Rec. 
S18,470 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1995). 
92. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., When There's No Draft, Wash. Post A23 (Apr. 6, 
1999)). 
93. See John A. Ferejohn, Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation, 
1947-1968 at 47-68 (Stanford U. Press, 1974); Terry M. Moe and William G. Howell, The 
Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J. L. Econ. & Org. 132 (1999). It goes without 
saying that opportunities to reward constituents this way have increased since World War 
II and, as such, track Congress's diminishing interest in war powers. 
94. For this very reason, the framers intended the Congress to play the dominant 
role in initiating military actions. See William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and 
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ing military strikes, a "rally around the president" phenomenon 
guarantees a surge of 10 percentage points or more in the presi-
dent's approval ratings.9 And with military technology now 
enabling presidents to wage war with few casualties, there are 
strong incentives to launch such strikes. Also, with Congress 
playing a diminishing role in war powers, expectations have de-
veloped about the president's constitutional powers and respon-
sibilities. For example, when reporters claim that the president 
does need the approval of Congress before launching military 
strikes, they encourage the public to believe that the president 
has the constitutional authority to initiate war.96 Against this 
backdrop, it is to be expected that the "president generally 
places a very hi~h value on control of the rights of governance in 
foreign affairs." 7 As these expectations of presidential domi-
nance have become entrenched, lawmakers are even less likely 
to risk the possible fallout (with their constituents) of opposing 
military actions launched by the President.98 
The judiciary, instead of questioning the president on na-
tional security matters and thereby protecting constitutional val-
ues, has largely stepped aside. Without the backing of Congress, 
the courts have left presidential decision-making alone-
validating it outright or concluding that they lack the jurisdiction 
to review it. In particular, starting with the war in Viet Nam, 
courts have seen the momentous question of whether the presi-
dent can commit the nation's blood to be outside its authority.99 
the Power to Declare War, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 695 (1997). 
95. This phenomenon has been documented by the Gallup News Service. In the 
wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the talk of military action in Afghanistan, 
the news service posted a study on its website comparing President George W. Bush's 
surge in approval ratings to the surges experienced by other Presidents in times of war. 
See David W. Moore, Bush Job Approval Reflects "Rally" Effect: Close to Highest Ap-
proval Rating Ever Measured, Gallup News Service, (Sept. 18, 2001), available at 
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/ pr010918.asp>. 
96. For example, in several articles in 1995, a reporter for The New York Times 
stated that President Clinton "does not need the approval of Congress to send troops to 
the Balkans." Katharine Q. Seelye, Legislators Get Plea by Clinton on Bosnia Force, 
N.Y. Times A1 (Nov. 29, 1995). For additional discussion, see Fisher, Abdication at 112-
14 (cited in note 4). For a recent counterexample, see David E. Sanger, There's a Small 
Matter of Checks and Balances, N.Y. Times 4-1 (Jan. 27, 2002). 
97. McGinnis, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. at 306 (cited in note 78). 
98. See Dante Fascell, War Powers and Congress, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 121, 124 
(1995). For a more detailed statement of how the individual interests of members of 
Congress and the institutional interests of Congress diverge on war powers, see Neal 
Devins, Abdication by Another Name: An Ode to Lou Fisher, 19 St. Louis U. Pub. L. 
Rev. 65 (2000). 
99. Law professors, many of whom opposed the war, were quick to condemn the 
courts for abdicating their responsibilities. See Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, The 
"Political Question Doctrine" and Foreign Relations, 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1135 (1970). 
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During Viet Nam, judges dismissed-as "obviously a political 
question" -some lawsuits challenging the president's authority 
to wage war. 100 In other cases, plaintiffs were denied standing to 
challenge the legality of the Viet N am war.101 And in a lawsuit 
filed by members of Congress, the court noted that it would not 
decide war powers cases unless the President and Congress were 
in "resolute conflict."102 For its part, the U.S. Supreme Court 
kept quiet by denying certiorari. 10 
This pattern from the VietNam years has carried forward to 
more recent decades. 104 The only noteworthy change is that 
members of Congress have become the principal antagonists be-
fore the courts. During the 1980s and 1990s, members of Con-
gress filed numerous lawsuits challenging the military initiatives 
of Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton. Typically, these mem-
bers came as a small group unable to represent what Congress 
intended as an institution. Also, they were often opposed by an-
other group of legislators who defended the President. Standing 
in the middle of this crossfire, federal judges essentially told the 
legislators complaining of executive aggrandizement: "Don't 
come in here and expect us to do your work for you." 
Congress's failure to stake out an institutional position 
prompted federal courts to toss out (on political question 
grounds) lawmaker challen~es to Reagan-era military strikes in 
Nicaragua and El Salvador. 05 Lawsuits challenging Reagan ini-
tiatives in Grenada and the Persian Gulf were, ultimately, dis-
100. Luftig v. McNamara, 252 F. Supp. 819, 819 (D.D.C. 1966), affd. 373 F.2d 664 
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967). See also DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 
1146, 1155 (2d Cir. 1973) (ruling that courts lack competence in military matters). 
101. Campen v. Nixon, 56 F.R.D. 404 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
102. Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854, 860 (D. Mass. 1973). 
103. For a critique of this practice, see Louis Henkin, Viet-Nam in the Courts of the 
Unired States: "Polirical Questions," 63 Am. J. Inti. Law 284 (1969). For a general defense 
(not at all tied to war issues), see Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: 
The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 126-33 (Hobbs-Merrill Co., 1962). 
104. For some judges, however, "no one" can bring a case challenging the Presi-
dent's use of force because courts lack "judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards" for addressing and analyzing such claims. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24-25 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, concurring). By making it impossible for courts ever to have 
a say, this type of ruling is not simply a ducking of the issue (whereby the courts could 
rule against the executive in some future case). Instead, it is effectively a substantive 
declaration of executive supremacy on war making. See Koh, The National Security 
Constitution at 216-24 (cited in note 3) (calling attention to how a political question rul-
ing can operate like a substantive ruling on the merits). 
105. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898-99 (D.D.C. 1982), affd, Crockett v. 
Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 
(D.D.C. 1983), affd. 770 F.2d 202,204,210 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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missed on mootness grounds. 106 Ripeness was invoked to block 
lawmakers challenging the constitutionality of President Bush's 
ordering of offensive actions against Iraq in 1990. "[U]nless the 
Congress as a whole, or by a majority, is heard from," wrote dis-
trict court judge Harold Greene, "the controversy here cannot 
be deemed ripe. "107 And in explaining why members of Con-
gress lacked standing to challenge President Clinton's launching 
of air strikes in Yugoslavia, the court noted that Congress would 
need to stake out an institutional position for there to be "an ac-
tual confrontation sufficient to confer standing. "108 
In concluding that there is no reason to protect a Congress 
that is unwilling to defend itself, courts have largely abdicated 
their role in military and national security matters. Unlike 
Youngstown (where congressional silence did not deter judicial 
action), today's courts seem oblivious to their constitutional duty 
to analyze and interpret legal boundaries. Instead, they wait for 
Congress to act. As then appellate judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
put it: Congress "has formidable weapons at its disposal-the 
power of the purse and investigative resources far beyond those 
available in the Third Branch ... 'If the Congress chooses not to 
confront the President, it is not our task to do so."d09 
The social and political forces that help explain Youngstown 
are no longer at play today. Presidential war-making is now an 
entrenched part of our cultural norms. Unless Congress wakes 
up, courts seem unwilling to participate in this dramatic reshap-
ing of our system of checks and balances. Lacking the powers of 
purse and sword, courts are reluctant to contradict cultural 
norms; instead, they look for ways to preserve their institutional 
resources. Findings of no jurisdiction, certiorari denials, and the 
like allow the courts to opt out of an issue until they have the 
backing of Congress and/or the people. 
Why this passivity by the courts on the crucial decision of 
taking the country to war? The Court had no problem contra-
dicting cultural norms during the Lochner era, and it certainly 
pushed the envelope with Roe v. Wade. The contemporary Su-
106. Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. 
Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987). For additional discussion, see Fisher, Abdication at 72-73 (cited 
in note 4). 
107. Del/urns v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1151 (D.D.C. 1990). 
108. Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 43 (D.D.C. 1999), affd. 203 F.3d 19 
(D.C. Cir. 2000). 
109. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 211 (quoting Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 
998 (Powell, J., concurring)). 
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preme Court, moreover, is not at all shy about countermanding 
Congress for violating its enumerated powers on federalism and 
other structural matters. 110 Against this backdrop, the Court's 
acquiescence to cultural norms on war-making is disappointing. 
The Justices should care about the structural protections of 
separation of powers, and how that value is threatened by uni-
lateral presidential wars. 
Were lawmakers to defend their prerogatives, courts pre-
sumably would adjudicate these disputes and might well rule for 
the Congress. Indeed, "[i]n two hundred years of dispute be-
tween the President and Congress over war and peace, commit-
ment and neutrality, trade embargoes and arms sales," the Su-
preme Court has yet to invalidate a federal statute for impinging 
on the president's foreign-affairs powers. 111 On this point, Viet 
Nam era litigation is especially instructive. Before there was 
popular opposition to the war, courts simply concluded that they 
lacked jurisdiction to consider challenges to the constitutionality 
of the war. In the final round of litigation, "when popular and 
congressional opposition to the war was at its peak," 112 the 
courts moderated their position. While affording the president 
wide latitude to "wind down" the war, courts now argued that 
the authorization issue was justiciable and that the Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution could not substitute for a congressional dec-
laration of war. 113 
Today, Youngstown seems curiously vibrant and anachron-
ous. It remains vibrant because of its essential lesson: it appears 
that contemporary courts will only check presidential war mak-
ing when social and political forces support such a judicial role. 
As a practical matter, this means that Congress cannot count on 
the courts to protect its prerogatives. Concurring in Youngs-
town, Justice Jackson, in words that reflect the modern (not tra-
ditional) understanding of war powers, put it this way: '"The 
tools belong to the man who can use them.' We may say that 
110. It may be that Congress has encouraged this federalism revolution. See Neal 
Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress Cru-
sade, 51 Duke L.J. 435 (2001). 
111. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy at 13 (cited in note 69). Furthermore, only 
one appellate court has invalidated an act of Congress on these grounds. See id. (refer-
ring to National Federation of Federal Employees v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 1196 
(1988). 
112. Cole, 99 Yale L.J. at 2083 (cited in note 3). 
113. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 614-16 (D.C. Cir. 1973); HoltZTTUUI v. 
Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1311 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied 416 U.S. 936 (1974). For a 
fuller treatment of this evolution, sec Ratner and Cole, 17 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. at 730-35 
(cited in note 56). 
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power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Con-
gress, but only Con~ress itself can prevent power from slipping 
through its fingers." 14 Essentially, Jackson was admitting that 
the Court could not interpret the constitutional authority of the 
President unless Congress asserted its role. That is a distinctly 
modern notion. Courts in the past did not think that way. 
It is for this very reason that Youngstown also seems a relic 
of the past. Congress has let power slip from its fingers. More 
striking, presidents now routinely claim the type of unlimited 
power that was anathema to the courts at the time of Youngs-
town. Federal court filings, for example, now contend that "[t]he 
Constitution commits to the executive branch the conduct of 
American diplomatic and foreign affairs," and that whether hos-
tilities exist or are imminent involves the President's responsi-
bilities as 'Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy' ... and 
as 'sole organ of the nation in its external relations.'" 115 And 
while federal courts have not formally embraced these claims 
(preferring, instead, to rule on jurisdictional grounds), the Su-
preme Court has adopted doctrinal formulas that put the onus 
on Congress to speak against presidential initiatives (rather than 
on the President to demonstrate that his conduct has been au-
thorized by Congress or the Constitution). 116 
III. CONCLUSION 
The erosion of our system of checks and balances on war 
powers issues, while understandable, is unfortunate. Complex 
social policy issues, especially those that implicate constitutional 
values, are best resolved through "the sweaty intimacy of crea-
tures locked in combat."117 More to the point, no branch of gov-
ernment should hold a monopoly on any of the Constitution's 
key provisions; instead, "[s]ome arbiter is almost indispensable 
114. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
115. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy at 108 (cited in note 69) (quoting appellate 
brief filed by the Justice Department in Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 
1987), a case involving President Reagan's deployment of troops to the Persian Gulf). 
116. The most important of these cases is Dames and Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 
(1981). Here, the Court approved a Carter-era executive agreement securing the release 
of American hostages. Because Congress did not formally approve of this arrangement, 
the Court found "tacit" Congressional approval both by looking to other statutes and 
Congress's silence in the face of the Carter initiative. In Youngstown, the Court specifi-
cally reJected a nearly identical Truman administration claim. See supra note 48. But in 
Dames and Moore, the Court signaled that the burden of proof should be shifted away 
from the president and to the Congress. 
117. Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch at 261 (cited in note 103). 
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when power is ... balanced between different branches."118 On 
war-making, the failure of Congress and the Court to check the 
President has made the Constitution less vital, less durable. By 
acting unilaterally, the president has effectively nullified the war-
making provisions of the Constitution. For these provisions to 
have meaning, someone has to give them legal effect. A Con-
gress that refuses to take a stand cannot accomplish this task. 
Likewise, judicial invocations of various jurisdiction-limiting 
doctrines eliminates the courts. 119 
Unlike constitutional dialogues on some issues that are bet-
ter left to the political branches, war powers is an issue where 
judicial passivity contributes to a loss of legitimacy to constitu-
tional government. 120 In particular, if it is the duty of courts to 
safeguard the Constitution, how can judges conscientiously look 
away while presidents usurp such a crucial power from the na-
tion's representatives? Do we have a Constitution of limits, or is 
it merely up for grabs? The Supreme Court reminds us that the 
Constitution is one of enumerated powers. 121 Obviously, con-
temporary Justices do not believe that when it comes to the war 
power. If that part of the Constitution can be regularly violated, 
why not others? Gradually we lose respect for a written Consti-
tution. 
Beyond undermining the constitutional design, we cannot 
expect foreign policy and national securit{; to be formulated well 
in the hands of an unchecked executive.1 2 Throughout our his-
tory, no branch has consistently demonstrated its wisdom on war 
powers issues. Neither Congress nor the President (nor the 
courts) can really assure the nation that it is truly wise on war 
powers issues; "[t]he only assurance," as Alexander Bickel ob-
served, "lies in process, in the duty to explain, justify and per-
118. Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy: A Study of a Crisis in 
American Power Politics 9 (Knopf, 1941). 
119. Without meaningful judicial review, there is reason to doubt the very legitimacy 
of presidential initiatives. "What a government of limited powers needs," as Charles 
Black explained, "is some means of satisfying the people that it has taken all steps hu-
manly possible to stay within its powers ... [T)he Court, through its history, has acted as 
the legitimator of the government." Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and the Court: Ju-
dicial Review in a Democracy 52 (Macmillan Co., 1960). Judicial review is also critical to 
the rule of law. See Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation 
of Powers, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 592, 612 (1986) (noting that the rule of law "requires that 
government not act except according to preestablished rule"). 
120. See Devins and Fisher, 84 Va. L. Rev. at 98-106 (cited in note 79) (arguing that 
interbranch conflict encourages the constructive evolution of constitutional norms). 
121. "Under our Constitution, the Federal Government is one of enumerated pow-
ers." Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997). 
122. See Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1637 (2000). 
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suade, to define the national interest by evoking it, and thus to 
act by consent."123 For example, even if one were to argue that 
presidents have institutional advantages over Congress in na-
tional security affairs,124 presidents may launch military initia-
tives to deflect attention from a policy crisis at home and for 
other reasons having little to do with the national interest. 
For reasons we have detailed, there is little reason to think 
that future presidents, Congresses, and Supreme Courts will re-
invigorate the system of checks and balances. Indeed, with no 
meaningful congressional resistance, President George W. Bush 
has invoked the ongoing "War on Terrorism" as justification for 
assertin~ "far greater powers for the executive branch at 
home."1 5 Although Bush sought congressional authorization 
both for the use of force against the terrorists and to launch an 
attack against Iraq, his administration almost always acts unilat-
erally without either consulting Congress or seeking statutory 
authority. 126 And while the public may ultimately disapprove of 
these initiatives,127 this after-the-fact check still leaves it to the 
123. Alexander M. Bickel, The Need for a War-Powers Bill, The New Republic 17, 
18 (Jan. 22, 1972). See also John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act 
That Worked, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1379, 1421 (1988) (favorably citing Bickel); Lee H. 
Hamilton, The Role of Congress in U.S. Foreign Policy, speech delivered to the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, at 1 (Nov. 19, 1998) (arguing that a better foreign 
policy is produced by a "creative tension between the President and the Congress"). 
124. In making this assumption, we do not mean to express an opinion on whether 
this view is correct. Arguments on this issue can be found in McGinnis, 56 Law & Con-
temp. Probs. at 305-08 (cited in note 78) (in support); Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy 
at 314-15 (cited in note 69) (detailing but, ultimately, rejecting these arguments); Fisher, 
Abdication at 166-70 (cited in note 4) (also rejecting). 
125. Sanger, There's a Small Matter of Checks and Balances (cited in note 96). See 
also David E. Sanger, Bush, Focusing on Terrorism, Says Secure U.S. is Top Priority, 
N.Y. Times A1 (Jan. 30, 2002) (noting President Bush's apparent willingness to launch 
military strikes against nations that are developing weapons that could be used against 
the United States) 
126. Initially, Bush's White House Counsel argued that Bush could launch an attack 
on Iraq without any congressional authority. For further discussion, see Louis Fisher, 
The Road to Iraq, Legal Times 32 (Sept. 2, 2002) (contending that this claim was based 
on weak or nonexistent arguments). 
127. In the short run, these initiatives are popular with the voters. See supra note 95 
(discussing the "rally around the flag" effect). Over time, however, they may prove un-
popular. For example, notwithstanding early public support, voters punished Truman for 
his handling of Korea by voting the Democrats out of office in 1952. Also, public disap-
proval of VietNam contributed to Johnson's decision not to run for reelection in 1968. 
Likewise, President George Bush's high approval ratings in 1991, after his successes in 
Iraq, had virtually disappeared a year later when he was defeated by Bill Clinton. Fi-
nally, George W. Bush's efforts to launch an attack against Iraq have been hamstrung by 
opinion polls showing that the public favored by 63% to 30% giving the United Nations 
more time to get weapon inspectors into Iraq. Adam Nagourney and Janet Elder, Public 
Says Bush Needs to Pay Heed to Weak Economy, N.Y. Times AI, A14 (Oct. 7, 2002). 
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president to set the terms and conditions governing the use of 
force. 
All of this brings us back to Youngstown. The speed in 
which the Court acted and the firmness of its decision is a testa-
ment to how social and political forces shape judicial decision-
making. And while the very forces that enabled the Court to 
check Truman now speak to the Court's refusal to resolve war 
powers disputes, the fact remains that today's Court has yet to 
embrace the President's claim of exclusive war-making power. 
Were the public (or Congress) willing to stand up to presidential 
unilateralism, the Court would likely restore its role in our sys-
tem of checks and balances. 
"The consequence of the limitations under which the Court 
must sometimes operate in this area," as Earl Warren put it, is 
that "[the people] must remain vigilant to preserve the principles 
of our [Constitution]."128 In Youngstown, with public opinion 
against the president, the war in Korea, and the steel seizure it-
self, courts were willing to repudiate the Truman administra-
tion's sweeping assertions of unlimited presidential powers. The 
lesson here is simple: For our system of checks and balances to 
work, all parts of government and the public must participate. 
Concentrating the whole of the war power in a single branch is 
repugnant to our constitutional system. 
128. Warren, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 192,203 (cited in note 67). 
